Indeterminacy of Translation as a Hermeneutic Doctrine by Peña, Lorenzo
INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION AS A
HERMENEUTIC DOCTRINE
Lorenzo Peña1
publ. in Hermeneutics and the Tradition
ed. by Daniel O. Dahlstrom
Washington: American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1988
pp. 212-24. ISBN 0-918090-22-9
Abstract
Quine’s Indeterminacy of Translation thesis is grounded in language-verificationism — the
claim that language contains no unverifiable relation. Quine’s thesis issues in a
hermeneutic doctrine to the effect that exegetical disputes are empty, any construal’s
correctness depending on the choice of a translation manual alone. Gadamer, on the
other hand, maintains that a sense is bestowed upon a text by the interpreter’s under-
standing horizon, the comprehension thus secured amounting to a merging of horizons.
Translation, according to Gadamer, is to be conceived as a recreation (Nachbildung).
While there are differences between Quine’s and Gadamer’ s views, I emphasize their
deep agreements. They both are in the end committed to embrace sense-relativism and
so to regard clashing interpretations as correct upon adequate choices. That relativism is
found fault with; for it entails that philosophical deliberation is futile, insomuch as a
philosophical system can be construed in such a way as to be equivalent to another,
when what was going on was pondering on which of them, if any, was true. The paper
concludes by rejecting the assumptions Quine’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutic doctrines
of sense-indeterminacy are based on.
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§O.- Introductory Remarks
This paper’s aim is to set up a reading of Quine’s Indeterminacy of Translation
Thesis (ITT henceforth) which shows its significance as a hermeneutical principle. My
conclusion will be that Quine encounters hermeneutical difficulties akin to the ones which
be set hermeneutical methodologies put forward by Gadamer, Coreth and other people
working within the continental tradition.
§1.- The Main Reason for ITT
The ITT says that, once two languages, L and L’, are given, for any sentence of L,
p , unless p belongs to a restricted set of sentences which is carefully marked off, there
are alternative ways of giving respective sentences of L’ as translations of p , each of those
ways being correct, even though such translations may well fail to agree in truth-value, let
1
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alone in «meaning». What does ‘translation’ mean in such a context? Only this: a sentence,
p’ , in L’ is a (right) translation of a sentence, p , in L iff it is right for a speaker of L’ to
report an utterance of p by a speaker of L by asserting that he has said that p’.
Thus, while Quine is sometimes taken to reject all intensional notions and esp.
indirect quotation or «believing that», in general, what indeed seems to be his own opinion
is that only unrelativized «believing that» is to be waived. For, since there are, for a
sentence p of L, several correct ways of translating it into L’ and thus several
nonequivalent ways of assigning beliefs to an utterer of p — assuming him to be sincere
— , not only do we lack any ground for relinquishing all concept of «believing that» and
«asserting that», but, what is more, the very existence of those alternative ways of rightly
translating a sentence enjoins us to conclude that we cannot do without those very same
concepts — otherwise there would be no way of rightly reporting a man’s words except
through direct quotation.
Quine has over the years put forward a number of reasons for countenancing the
ITT. But in a nutshell what seems to me the main reason is this one. Language is nothing
else but verbal behaviour; hence there is nothing to language — nothing to either syntactic
or semantic or pragmatic relations — which is not amenable to a study of linguistic
behaviour; in other words, any linguistically relevant relation has to be liable to observation
in the way patterns of linguistic behaviour are.
Now, any inquiry into linguistic behaviour is unable to settle upon one of the
different ways of translating a sentence. Suggesting that even so there nevertheless is just
one correct translation would amount to positing something in language beyond linguistic
behaviour, something immaterial for any study of such a behaviour.
Of course you may decide that sentence p refers to a situation s, which is referred
to in your own language by sentence p’ ; so p translates as p’ , any other non-equivalent
translation being incorrect; you may add that those relations are not immaterial for the study
of linguistic behaviour since translation is part and parcel of that behaviour.
However Quine would look upon your manoeuvre as begging the question.
Somehow or other translation is not part of the most normal or typical linguistic behaviour;
moreover, since what is at issue is whether or not translation is determinate, you cannot just
assume that it is, since there is no reason for supposing it is ensuant upon linguistic
behaviour as it takes place outside translation itself.
Should you reply that, pari passu, one could conclude that there are neither waves
nor particles, since study of physical phenomena enjoins upon us neither to positing waves
nor to positing particles, either postulation being handily sufficient on its own — provided
some further adjustments are made in each case — Quine would retort that there is no
parallel: physics concerns itself with physical entities and there is no reason either for saying
that particles or waves are not such or for regarding the world as being indeterminate as to
whether it has particles or waves — that far-fetched indeterminacy would in fact be hard to
word in a precise way.
Likewise and more generally: even though scientific theories are underdetermined
as a regards available evidence, that alone is no sufficient ground for us to say that, e.g., the
world is indeterminate as between theory T and theory T’, in such a way though that, if p ,
p’ , are respective conjuncts of the (finite) sets of axioms of T, T’, then «p’ or p» should
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nonetheless be true. No, nothing is to be gained through such a device. For, if the situation
is as just described — underdetermination of T, T’ by available evidence — either course of
choosing T alone or T’ alone would be simpler, and so better, than countenancing a theory
axiomatized through a disjunctive axiom with both disjuncts thought to be nontrue.
(That would amount to countenance a non-prime theory, a theory, that is, asserting
a disjunction but unable to assert either of the disjuncts; which would anyway force us to
jettison classical logia and embark upon some kind of supervaluation semantics or some
other device of that ilk.)
ITT has nothing to do with that. The principle of excluded middle entails that either
there are particles or there are not — and, if, somehow «by definition», a world without
particles would be a world containing just waves, then in virtue of excluded middle we’d
have that either there are particles or there are waves.
When a disjunction is true, one of the disjuncts at least is to be true. Nothing of the
sort happens concerning translation. When there are two ways of reporting someone’s
words, say ascribing to him either asserting that p or asserting that p’, what emerges is not
our concluding that he said either that p or that p’. No, what emerges is that we are to
dispose of a nonrelativezed notion of «asserting that».
No application of excluded middle can force upon us espousal of «He said either
that p’ or that p»; not even an application helping itself to a (plausible or useful)
«conceptual necessity» or «meaning postulate» like the one through which we had
concluded that if there are no particles, there are waves.
For one thing, although in order to set the doctrine in the clearest and simplest way
we have momentarily supposed that there were just two alternative available translations,
the number may well be infinite.
For another, nothing appears in virtue of which failing to assert the value of one
of those translations would entail asserting the value of another translation, even if there
were no available alternative translation; nothing except the assumption that in each case
the speaker asserts something definite, which is just what is at issue.
§2.- The Indeterminacy of Reference
Indeterminacy of Reference is an immediate corollary to ITT. Even though Quine
has worded indeterminacy of reference as ‘the inscrutability of reference’, that expression
seems to me unfortunate pragmatically implying as it does that there is some thing which
we would be right to scrutinize could we do so. If reference were determinate, translation
would be, too — even should we be unable to satisfy ourselves that this or that translation
was the correct one.
Several paragraphs earlier (in §1) I have spoken as if reference were a relation
between a sentence and a «situation», which of course for Quine’s it is not. In fact Quine
takes as primitive the relation of satisfaction. An object o satisfies a formula p iff, when
o is given as a value to the first free variable in p , the formula comes out true.
(That doesn’t intend to be a technical or precise definition. In fact, Tarski-wise truth
is to be defined through satisfaction rather than the other way round; moreover satisfaction
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is explained by Quine not for an object, but for a sequence of objects. But all that is outside
our point.)
In his nontechnical writings, Quine has worded his semantic doctrine through the
expression of being the value of a variable. I think some misunderstandings have followed,
e. g. that for Quine something is the value of a variable regardless of the truth or falsity of
the formulas the variable features in. No, for Quine an object o, is the value of a variable,
x, featuring free in a satisfiable formula, p , iff when we give o as a value to x p comes
out true. (In other words: iff any sequence whose first component is o satisfies p provided
x is the only free variable in p ; adjustments can be made for the case the latter proviso
does not hold.)
Of course, Quine is interested not just in categorial truth but also in hypothetical
one: if you profess theory T, thus asserting any of its theorems, p , you may be said to
refer to (or be committed to) object o insomuch as o alone satisfies p. (Thus even though
a closed formula is satisfied by all things, you don’t refer to the Statue of Liberty by saying
that there are squirrels.) Which means that, if your theory is true, if p in particular is true,
o satisfies p — i. e. o is a value of the first free variable in p .
There are clouds surrounding that at first blush clear and simple notion of referring-
to and of being committed to: one of them concerns the either extensional or purportedly
intensional nature of such a commitment; another, the problem raised by the case of several
objects shared by all models of a theory without there being any one of them uniquely
referred to by the theory — uniquely satisfying a certain theorem of the theory; and so on.
Quine himself has refined his theory on ontological commitment and reference in order to
cope with some of those issues.
Other authors have also endeavoured to deal with some other difficulties, as e.g. the
purportedly intensional nature of ontological commitment — to my mind unsatisfactorily,
since intensionalization is a most unQuinean way of handling matters. Be it as it may, I’m
not going to dwell on those issues here.
What I want to point out is that ontological commitment is for Quine relative: as
relative as translation is. For the core of ITT is precisely that there is no uniquely way of
assigning to expressions and formulas of a language respectively objects and truth-conditions
as that which those expressions refer to and that which those sentences convey.
It is safe to say that a name n refers to an object o iff the corresponding Quinean
predicate «n-izing» is such that the open formula «x n-izes» is satisfied by o. For any other
predicate, f, we shall say objects of some kind are referred to by f iff at least one of those
objects satisfies «fx» while nothing satisfies «fx» unless it is of the kind in question. Let’s
now take a very simple example.
Michel says in French ‘Les lapins sont jolis’. I may rightly take it that what he says
is to be translated as follows: ‘Rabbit hood is included in prettiness’, where rabbithood and
prettiness are taken to be intensional attributes while inclusion is understood extensionally.
A Quinean extensionalist would maintain that what Michel says is false, since there
is no rabbithood. Of course Michel’s utterance might all the same be regarded as
pragmatically truelike - a notion which may set defined in an easy-going way; but that is
by the way.
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What now matters is that my translation of Michel’s words is as good as your
translation according to which he has said that rabbits are pretty, which we both deem true.
What objects does Michel’s expression ‘les lapins’ refer to? According to my translation,
that French expression — at least as Michel uses it in that context-is a proper name n, whose
Quinean transform would be the predicate «being identical to n»; which, upon being
juxtaposed to a free variable, results in an open formula which can be satisfied by nothing
else but rabbithood, if at all. (In fact, being an extensionalist, I go on to maintain that
nothing does satisfy such a formula.)
Is Michel really committed to intensional attributes simply because of my deviant
way of translating what he says? Well, that is just a bad question. For, if we were right on
ITT, ontological commitment is relative: it is, independently of any viewpoint, neither true
nor false that Michel is committed to attributes. Were ontological commitment absolute,
reference, satisfaction and truth-conditions would be absolute, too; and so would be
translation — at the very least it would be determinate up to truth-conditions, which is a lot.
§3.- The Nature of Semantic Relativity
What exactly is the nature of the relativity enjoyed by reference and other semantic
relations? Two candidates are to be rejected. First, the idea that the relativity — or
indeterminacy — in question amounts to some situation which can be expressed through a
conditional statement; something like this: «If manual of translation M is correct, then…».
That will not do. For one thing, in such a case translation would be determined —
up to truth conditions at least. For another, the adjective ‘right’ in the protasis is misused,
since there is no sense in which a translation manual is «correct» as an assertive sentence
is, that is to say to the exclusion of alternatives: if «p» is right, «not-p» is wrong, while the
«rightness» or «correctness» of a translation manual doesn’t rule out rightness of alternative
translation manuals.
The second candidate we ought to dismiss is the idea that the relativity in question
is some kind of dependence on tacit premises, or presuppositions, or assumptions. The
reasons are quite similar: a premise is something taken to be true; a translation manual is
neither true nor false.
Withal, were the relativity or indeterminacy in question nothing else but correctness
of alternative reasonings depending on respective sets of assumptions, translation would not
be accurately said to be indeterminate — nor would reference either, of course; for then
things could be straightened out and de-relativized by setting upon the right assumption —
or anyway upon an assumption we took to be right.
What seems to me to constitute Quine’s view on the relativity of reference could
be briefly articulated like this. A speaker is rightly taken to refer to some object, or to
convey through his statements some particular truth-conditions, only relatively to two chosen
parameters: a language wherein the indirect quotation is made, and a translation manual
Let’s now ignore or disregard the former. As for translation manuals, they are
stipulated, la id down, not asserted. A translation manual is not a set of sentences of the
form «‘e’ refers to o» or «The truth-conditions of «p» are that so and so be the case», or
anything of that sort. Such sentences involve the by now junked notion of determinate,
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nonrelative reference and truth-conditions. No, a translation manual is rather a set of
imperative statements like that: ‘Let «e» go into «o»’, and so on. A translation manual is
a set of rules. (Of course you can view rules as functions rather than either injunctions or
allowances.)
Accordingly, all semantic relations are, according to Quine, indeterminate or
relativized in the way just pointed out: no semantic relation obtains independently of a
choice; the choice in question is that of both a target-language and translation manual
Interpreting a text is nothing else but translating it from one language into another — even,
of course, if those languages happen to be the same.
So all discussions concerning how to interpret an author are misguided: provided
a very few requirements are met, any such interpretation is right — right, that is, depending
on the choice of a translation manual You can go on debating about whether Plato said or
«intended to say» this or that. But the dispute is empty.
The same thing applies to Quine himself of course. Quine may try to «clarify» his
views by laying down that some of his own former utterances are to be read this way or the
other; but anyhow what he is thus doing is nothing else but choose some particular
translation manual (most times a non-homographic one), which is neither better nor worse
than any other. No one has the privilege of being alone entitled to prescribe translation
manuals, even when his own writings are concerned. For else translation and reference
would, or might, be determinate.
§4.- The Problem of Settling upon a Text’s Real Sense in Contemporary
Hermeneutics
It seems to me apposite to try and apply Quine’s ITT to some hermeneutic pro-
blems as they have emerged in historic-philosophical scholarship. New analytic approaches
have be en recently set up and developed to a great many philosophical texts, esp. to those
of ancient philosophers.
Analytic readings of the Presocratics, of Plato, Aristotle and so on have by now
acquired wide currency. That has given rise to some sharp reactions. It seems clear to some
people that the new interpretations make violence to the texts under consideration, by having
them address questions their authors never brought up and by wording their claims in terms
their authors cannot even have conceived of, as such terms are fraught with «connotations»
borrowed from contemporary philosophy.
On the one hand, (almost) everyone agrees that no interpretation of a philosophical
text is (philosophically at least) interesting unless it shows:
(1) the relevance of what the author had to say — and, we hope, somehow managed
to say in the thus interpreted text — to problems which are not peculiar to him or his times;
(2) that the thus interpreted doc trine can be understood as an available — and, at
least at first blush, or up to a point, sensible — alternative to other approaches to the same
issues. (The latter demand is perhaps too strong. It would be more cautions to be content
with the thus interpreted doctrine’s being possessed of something or other to recommend it,
some kind of buttressing evidence or argument.)
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On the other hand, though, some boundary is to be drawn, since what surely cannot
be indulged in is a boundless application in historical scholarship of conceptual frameworks
quite foreign to the authors we try to read.
Some interpreters2 emphasize the austerity principle: they insist that you must
forbear attributing to the philosopher you read assumptions such that there is no special
reason to think they were obvious to him, or inferences he did not make in so many words,
or commitment to entities which he did not explicitly posit. As Gluck puts it (op. cit., p.395)
you ought to read the texts instead of reading into them.
The opposite trend is represented by people who, like Jonathan Barnes or David
Charles,3 try to assess the philosophical significance of the interpreted philosophers’ claims
by comparing them with solutions put forward today, thus preferring to stress constraints
like explanatory coherence or reading each text in the light of others by the same author.
Now, while working with the latter kind of approach broadly construed, H.N.
Castañeda, in his interpretations of Plato, Leibniz and other past philosophers, has
nevertheless la id emphasis on hermeneutic requirements the most striking of which is that
every text is to be read and understood on its own; what he demands is a Darwinian
method, a piece-meal approach, taking each text as a separate exegetical unit; while
Castañeda recognizes it is difficult to determine what is to count as a text-unit in each case,
he thinks that such a kind of approach is all in all better.
Let us now consult one of the greatest hermeneutic thinkers, - Hans-Georg
Gadamer. Like Emerich Coreth and Paul Ricoeur, he insists that our readings or construals
are unavoidably conditioned by our fore-understanding horizon, i. e. by our set of concepts,
problems, assumptions, which it would be futile to try sidestepping. While they all preach
to strenuously attempt to catch the sense or senses of what the philosophers said and
somehow or other plunge into their own understanding horizon, they nevertheless warn us
that it would be of no use to strip ourselves of our conceptual framework, since, were it
possible, it would thwart all our own efforts to grasp a sense at all.4
Gadamer has therefore stressed the positive role of fore-judgments. Doubtless, he
also sets up as an hermeneutic goal what he calls a fusion or blending of horizons — the
interpreter’s and the interpreted one’s. But such a blending — which Coreth and others have
deemed an impossible target to attain and one which would not constitute real understanding
— not only does not rule out the persistence of our own understanding horizon, but even it
rules it in, it calls for that persistence.
Gadamer hence says (ibid. p.374) that there can be no interpretation which is right
in or by itself: every interpretation amounting to, or at least supervening upon, a blending
of horizons, each of the two thus merged horizons is to persist up to the point they become
one. It is then out of the question to approach the other’s horizon from nowhere, so to
speak.
2
. E.g. Richard Robinson in his Plato’ s Earlier Dialectic, Oxford, 1983; or John Glucker in his critical study of Oxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy, appeared in Philosophia, vol. 16 (1986), pp. 389ff.
3
. See e.g. the latter’s Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action, Duckworth, 1984.
4
. See Wahrheit und Methode, 2d. ed., p. 373.
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§5.- Gadamer and Quine’s Views on Translation
Gadamer has shown how all the hermeneutic enterprise is mediated by language.
Every translation is an interpretation.5 A translation is the fulfilment of a sense that the
translator bestows upon the text offered to him.
Granted, Gadamer says (ibid.) that the hermeneutic problem proper is outside
translation, since he thinks that when people speak with one another they do not translate:
so the hermeneutic problem is not that of attaining a good mastering of a language, but that
of reaching an agreement about the thing which is implemented or carried out by means of
language.
Through linguistic intercourse what is at issue is an understanding not so much of
what the other has said as of him who says it: we try to set or catch his meaning (Meinung),
which does not boil down to a particular sense of his words. However, such comprehension
is a recreation (Nachbildung): we can only reach the philosopher’s meaning — what he me
and — by approaching the sense or senses of his words. Now, Gadamer recognizes (pp. 363
ff) that in practice things are somehow more complicated: for, even if I understand the
other’s language, I cannot reach the blending of our two horizons if my own conceptual
framework, minted as it is in my language, remains outside my dealings with his words and
his problems.
Thus, I am at the end compelled to fall back on translation. and every translation
proceeds by overhighlighting überhellung). This is why the translation’s output is more clear
than its input, a distance the interpreter is painfully aware of.
Let us compare Gadamer’s claims with Quine’s. Both stress that translating entails
interpreting and even that it is nothing else but interpreting. Both reject the idea that the
translated text’s sense is something independent of the translator’s approach (cf. Gadamer,
p.448).
So, both of them recognize some kind or other of translation indeterminacy. They
both denounce neutrality as an illusion: it is not by, so to say, approaching a text without
tools taken from your own gear that «the real sense» of the text is going to make itself
manifest to you.
Beyond those agreements, though, there are no less important discrepancies. For
Gadamer a text has many senses, it is full of senses, and its senses somehow are combined
or heaped up on it. For Quine a text’s sense is unique — except in cases of plurivocity,
which for him lie outside what is now at issue — once a language target and a translation
manual have been chosen.
(That the translation’s output is in turn indeterminate as regards its own sense is a
quite different matter: the given text’s sense is relative neither to its output, nor to the
output’s own sense or senses, but to (the choice of)the tools used in reaching that output.)
For Gadamer there is some case of comprehension in which no translation is needed
— indeed all translation is ruled out at that case, since what is there going on is direct
5
. Ibid., p.362: the German term he uses is Auslegung.
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understanding through conversation in the same language. For Quine all understanding is
translation, no difference of principle separating out the communication through what at first
blush appears to be one same language from any other communication: for the claim that
both communicants mean the same by the same words is, not debatable, but in fact a
meaningless claim, ignoring as it does the ITT: that you mean the same as I do by saying
something is neither true nor false unless and until a translation manual has be en given, and
then it is either true or false as regards that translation manual
For Gadamer there is some further entity, the Meinung of the text’s author, which
is to be grasped through the catching of a sense of the text. Nothing of the sort is posited
by Quine. What is more, Quine’s philosophical principles would indeed rule out any such
entity at all.
So Quine would have nothing to do with Gadamer’s understanding someone beyond
— even though by way of — understanding what he says. Furthermore, Quine cannot be
prepared to accept a fusion or a welding of horizons: the very notion would sound odd to
him, to say the least; and he would stress that, if by an understanding horizon we mean a
conceptual framework comprising both a language — which can be thought to include a set
of statements which are «analytic» in the weak sense that they have be en learnt by learning
the language — and a translation manual, then understanding horizons cannot merge.
A conceptual framework is made to correspond to another through translation
manuals, but cannot be blended either with or into it: it cannot do it outside translation —
since there is no other way for two such frameworks to become counterparts of one another;
and it cannot do it by means of translation either, since translation does not impinge upon
the two systems’ respective identity — quite on the contrary, the very reality of translation
calls for each of those systems to be there (remember that, even when the source-language
and the target-language are, as we would normally say, one and the same, their real identity,
which requires meaning identity of each word, is neither true nor false on its own, but only
true or false upon some particular translation manual or other).
Finally, Quine cannot accept Gadamer’s idea of an agreement on the thing itself
concerned by the ongoing communication. For, according to Quine, there is no unique or
determined relation of concerning or referring to. Indeterminacy of translation carries in its
wake indeterminacy of reference, of ontological commitment and of ontology itself (the
thesis of ontological relativity). Gadamer seems to think instead that, even though sense is
not uniquely determined, the semantic relation of referring to or being about is.
On that point, Quine seems to me more coherent, since it is hard to understand how
the being-about relation can be determined if sense is not: should one message have
different senses for different translation manuals — which of course Gadamer somehow
seems committed to but never recognizes explicitly in so many words — there would, or at
least might, be as many things concerned by the message; unless a postulate is la id down
to the effect that all the different senses a message may have are «about» the same thing
or things — an extremely implausible postulate unlikely to be justified in any reasonable
way.
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§6.- The Hermeneutic Difficulties of the Indeterminacy Thesis
In spite of differences, Quine’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutic doctrines share, as we
saw in the previous section, a number of points. This is why they face similar difficulties.
The main blemish those doctrines labour under is paradoxically ensuant upon an
important advantage they have over such as countenance sense determinacy. Remember the
unmanageable difficulty brought up above, in §4: to what extent are we entitled to read a
text by somehow reading into it — i. e. by reading it through our conceptual glasses?
Were such a procedure warranted, the path would be open to unbridled arbitrariness
and wantonly subjectivistic interpretation. But else, we turn out to be deprived of something
we cannot do without; for it is me who wants to understand, which I cannot do if my act
of purportedly understanding is cut off from everything I normally think, if it has to take
place through terms bearing no relationship to the ones I am acquainted with.
Such a problem seems to find a Solomonic, easy-going solution by means of
Quine’s ITT. Quine would tell us that there is no fact of the matter over whether, say, Plato
did or did not accept states of affairs in his ontology. He accepted them upon some
translation manuals, while he didn’t upon other translation manuals.
Is that the end of the matter? Perhaps not. We could discuss respective merits of
those translation manuals. Not the merit of correctness, which they all have anyway, but
virtues of simplicity, elegance, compliance with some useful stipulations — useful in order
to so arrive at translation outputs fitting more nicely into our accepted history of philosophy
schemes.
(Considerations of such a kind have be en taken advantage of and knitted into some
objections levelled against the ITT: after all some translations seem in the end to be more
plausible than others, more in accordance with the remainder of our whole linguistic
behaviour, don’t they? Quine could reply that, even if there is such a gradation, even the
worst-off translation manuals are utterly honourable ones — or, put in less colourful terms,
perfectly compatible after all with linguistic behaviour as a whole.)
What is more, Quine might even look upon such hermeneutic disputes as
confirming evidence accruing to his own case for ITT. Either way you regard things, there
is no clinching argument for or against a construal of Plato which avails itself of currently
fashionable concepts, or terms, and addresses issues that (or as) are being debated now a
days. He would add that language contains no unverifiable relation, since language is just
linguistic communication, linguistic behaviour — and something unverifiable about such a
behaviour sounds like a contradictio in adjecto.
Therefore, Quine would conclude, the very unsolvableness of hermeneutic disputes
shows that they are basically empty — even if they can go on once they have been duly
modified: do not discuss over what Plato really said but over what translation manual is
nicer.
Gadamer would be neither so definite nor, I am afraid, so clear as Quine over those
hermeneutic controversies. Exegetical disputes are not so obviously rejected by his
hermeneutic doctrine as they are by Quine’s. Nevertheless, I take him to be committed in
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the end to conclusions quite similar to Quine’s. Since a text’s senses are never exhausted,
since they keep on being constituted over the time and, far from existing on their own, or
by themselves, acquire existence somehow by their being bestowed upon the original text
by the interpreter’s Nachbildungen, what we have in the last resort is nothing else but an
indeterminacy situation very much like Quine’s.
No unique sense is to be gathered from Plato’s writings independently of our
respective hermeneutical tools and keys. So, it turns out to be fine and O.K. for you to say
that Plato countenanced states of affairs, but not for me. We thus leave each other in peace.
Henceforth we can keep on debating, but more friendly. After all it is no longer a question
of one of us being right and the other wrong. It is a question of finding out which way of
recreating Plato’s texts is, e.g., more suggestive, or more interesting.
Now, what might appear to be an advantage turns out to be a redhibitory flaw.
Those doctrines cannot account for exegetical disputes in any straightforward way. As a
consequence, philosophical debate also becomes empty.
Suppose I am mulling over the acceptance of relations as irreducible entities.
Hitherto I had not admit ted them in my ontology. Now, while pondering upon the pros and
cons of such an admission, I suddenly realize how futile my deliberation is: I tell myself
that my revamped system positing relations would be translatable into my old one lacking
them. There is always some device or other to be fallen back on for facilitating such a
translation.
(After all it is possible to «reduce» all entities to natural numbers using the
Löwenheim-Skolem theorem — and so it is possible to convince oneself that one has always
be en and will always be a Pythagorean, even if, as one’s system is worded, it superficially
countenances non-numerical entities.)
Quine has developed sharp techniques of ontological reduction (the proxy
functions). and he has, as is well-known, devised some restrictions to their application, in
order to shun Pythagoreanism. Well and good. But what our current line of argument seems
to show is that such daintiness is misplaced.
There is no fact of the matter over whether or not one is Pythagorean, even for
oneself. All depends on the translation manual chosen. If right now I am a convinced
Pythagorean I can satisfy myself that it is immaterial for me to change my mind on the
subject or not: either way, my future worldview can be translated into the one I have so far
held on to, both as being in agreement and, alternatively — by choosing another translation
manual — , as disagreeing on the point I was considering.
Even though it is not as easy to argue that Gadamer’s theory entails results similar
to those we have just mentioned — Gadamer’s approach is after all not so clear-cut and crisp
as Quine’s — , it is almost obvious, yet, that much the same applies to his doctrine.
I take those unsavoury conclusions to constitute refutations of those doctrines. It
may be hard to put up with unverifiable entities, either in general or in linguistic behaviour.
But we are compelled to take then up, willy nilly. We may be at a loss as to how to read
Plato, and may well remain forever unable to find conclusive evidence on either side of
many an exegetical dispute.
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However sense cannot be indeterminate. Perhaps there are sundry senses to one text,
but what certainly cannot be the case is for those senses to depend on, and vary as, the
reader’s hermeneutic tools or keys. Semantic relations are determinate.
